Select to expand quotePaddles B'mere said..
I'd be surprised if a lot of systems data isn't transmitted in real time via satellite directly to aircraft and engine manufacturers these days.
It is.. Rolls Royce do it..
www.rolls-royce.com/products-and-services/civil-aerospace.aspx
www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2014/03/13/aircraft-engine-monitoring-how-it-works-and-how-it-could-help-malaysia-air-370-crash-investigtors/#5d68930e7620
The engine manufacturers and also Boeing have proprietary monitoring systems for aircraft and power plants that store and then send data back to the factory, they used to do it in bursts via ground stations (when available) but I wondered whether they may have moved to satellite comms by now. Engine maintenance is big money FN, they love to know when they need to spend big money so they don't spend it before they need to.
Select to expand quotePaddles B'mere said..
The engine manufacturers and also Boeing have proprietary monitoring systems for aircraft and power plants that store and then send data back to the factory, they used to do it in bursts via ground stations (when available) but I wondered whether they may have moved to satellite comms by now. Engine maintenance is big money FN, they love to know when they need to spend big money so they don't spend it before they need to.
Yeah, I guess this makes sense. I know that this was one of the ways they figured out where MH370 could have been, but I didn't think there was much data sent. although even a 'lot' of data for engine is probably not much.
Rolls Royce and GE have had real time engine monitoring for around a decade or more.
Yep, it's common in the transport industry. Many powerplant suppliers to machinery use telemetry data for performance monitoring an also to make maintenance more cost efficient (and also transfer liability if the powerplant is used incorrectly 
)
Personally, i think the way some things drive stairs on the tarmac to 737's blind in second rate airports makes vertical angle of attack sensor vanes throw away material !
Take a look where the stairs are !!!
globalnews.ca/video/4623182/lion-air-passenger-films-final-moments-before-boarding-ill-fated-flight-610-in-jakarta
Oh crap, now it turns out that even though there were two angle of attack sensors, the MCAS system only got input from one of them, unless you paid extra for the optional feature that looked for a discrepancy in the measurement from each of them. So, multi-million dollar passenger Jet liner is sold with a known single point of failure, and you need to pay extra to get the safe version. Seriously, there is no criminal negligence or liability here? 
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/boeing-sold-safety-feature-that-could-have-prevented-737-max-crashes-as-an-option/
Select to expand quoteHarrow said..
Oh crap, now it turns out that even though there were two angle of attack sensors, the MCAS system only got input from one of them, unless you paid extra for the optional feature that looked for a discrepancy in the measurement from each of them. So, multi-million dollar passenger Jet liner is sold with a known single point of failure, and you need to pay extra to get the safe version. Seriously, there is no criminal negligence or liability here?
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/boeing-sold-safety-feature-that-could-have-prevented-737-max-crashes-as-an-option/
Probably needed to tell the pilots they changed stuff as well....
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/11/indonesia-737-crash-caused-by-safety-feature-change-pilots-werent-told-of/
The Operational Manual Bulletin sent out by Boeing on November 6 provides procedures for dealing with that sort of situation, but no prior training provided by Boeing ever mentioned the automated system.
[Update 4:30 pm ET] The text of Boeing's bulletin read:
This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition. In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of the following indications and effects:- Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
- Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
- Increasing nose down control forces.
- Inability to engage autopilot.
- Automatic disengagement of autopilot.
- IAS DISAGREE alert.
- ALT DISAGREE alert.
- AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)
- FEEL DIFF PRESS light.In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the 737 - 8 / - 9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.
Handy info to have prior to takeoff??
There was an interesting discussion on ABC radio a few weeks back where one of the "experts" stated there will be a movement back to supersonic commercial passenger flights within the next decade.
Predicted flight times to London from Aus around 8hrs
LA in under 6
So if Boeing's "solution" is to fit a light that indicates a sensor fault, does that mean that previously there was no way of indicating a sensor fault to the pilot????
I find it astounding that a civilian airliner with maybe a couple of hundred people aboard doesn't have some sort of sensor failure monitoring and indication system for the operator, yet a dumb@rse coal conveyor that is only ever accessed by highly trained technicians has to have a safety system that fully self monitors all of it's equipment and sensors.
Nope, I was asking a question. I was reading in the press that a proposed solution is a previous "option" to have a light that informs the captain of a sensor failure. It seems wild to me that this "feature" isn't normal considering that sensor failure feedback is very normal and in fact mandatory for the safety systems of the most basic of industrial equipment here in Australia.
www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-22/boeing-plans-to-reverse-optional-safety-feature-on-737-max-fleet/10928066
From what I have read there are plenty of indicators that there is a problem with the auto trim, spinning trim wheels being the most obvious, the pilots need to switch off the electric trim, a feature that has been there since the early years. So now they will have a warning light too, but will they know what to do?
There are a lot of people flying planes that don't really know how to fly when the auto pilot isn't working as it should.
The Max 8 is doomed. It was a fudge to start with and needed fudges to fix the consequences from the fudges. You can blame pilots who should have been better trained and faulty sensors, but the problems can be traced back to the design of that model.
Boeing were caught with their pants down by not committing to designing a whole new aircraft to replace the 737 in response to the use of larger diameter fuel efficient engines. To fit them on a 737 and still maintain ground clearance they had to mount them forward on the wing. Flight dynamics changed and computer systems had to be designed to keep the plane flying properly. Fudges on fudges and poor decisions on poor decisions.
Now no one will buy the Max 8, and they will be forced to accelerate the design and construction of a new plane at great cost, while market share goes to their competitors.
Negligence and tragic loss of life aside, it will be used as an example in future of how poor decisions made to maximise margins now can have company killing ramifications down the track.
That's a brutal assessment Paradox, but possibly true. It's a commercial disaster spawned from the engineering maybe not being able to deliver a solution that suited their business plan. I don't think it will have "company killing ramifications" because Boeing have gobbled up most of their competitors and are a mega corporation with ongoing large military and civilian contracts. But if this had happened to Boeing a couple of decades ago things would possibly been quite different. Either way, it's going to cost them a packet in penalties and damages plus even more in market share and market confidence ............. it's a true commercial disaster for them.
Select to expand quoteParadox said..
The Max 8 is doomed. It was a fudge to start with and needed fudges to fix the consequences from the fudges. You can blame pilots who should have been better trained and faulty sensors, but the problems can be traced back to the design of that model.
Boeing were caught with their pants down by not committing to designing a whole new aircraft to replace the 737 in response to the use of larger diameter fuel efficient engines. To fit them on a 737 and still maintain ground clearance they had to mount them forward on the wing. Flight dynamics changed and computer systems had to be designed to keep the plane flying properly. Fudges on fudges and poor decisions on poor decisions.
Now no one will buy the Max 8, and they will be forced to accelerate the design and construction of a new plane at great cost, while market share goes to their competitors.
Negligence and tragic loss of life aside, it will be used as an example in future of how poor decisions made to maximise margins now can have company killing ramifications down the track.
This is true from what I have read and was driven by one of many reasons but also from the need not to have a new plane that needed new training of pilots. By keeping the 737 platform and doing a cut and hack, airlines would not need the cost of training their existing pilots to fly them.
The tail jack screw problem which looks to be the cause of both accidents did not have any warnings on the dash but was available as an upgrade with warnings but apparently most airline do not purchase the upgrade. Something about pilot information overload is one reason not.
Failed tail jack screw?? That was Alaskan 261 from nearly 20 years ago? These latest two appear to be a faulty angle of attack sensors and how they interacted with the software controlling the pitch of the aircraft?
Select to expand quoteChris6791 said..
With 5000 max on order these two crashes are a short term PR and logistical nightmare for Boeing. Hardly a company killer. The Max will fly again and within a few news cycles the dead will be buried and all is forgotten except for a couple of Wikipedia pages and a memorial somewhere. Harsh but true; unless they lose a third one...
I have no doubt the max will be made airworthy. The issue is that you now have the media and public being bombarded by reports that indicate there is a significant problem in the way at least one part of the plane was designed and approved. Trust is gone and is not easily gained back.
The max is easily identifiable by the winglets.....and people can see the plane assigned to a route when they book. If the public refuse to fly in it, it will significantly effect an airlines decision to fly it and would be grounds to cancel orders. Don't underestimate the power of public opinion over logic or truth in today's world.
Maybe it isn't a company killer in this case as Boeing is huge and can probably absorb the fallout, my point was it is an example that "can" be a company killer and probably would be for a smaller manufacturer.
Don't underestimates the public's willingness to take a cheap flight over safety issues.
